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KTUNAXA NATION V. BRITISH COLUMBIA:
A HISTORICAL AND CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF
CANADIAN ABORIGINAL LAW
Jennifer Mendoza†
Abstract:
Aboriginal law is a developing and emerging area of the law in Canada.
In fact, Aboriginal rights were not constitutionally protected until the ratification of the
Canadian Constitution in 1982. What followed was a series of precedent-setting cases that
clarified what “rights” meant under Section 35 of the Constitution, how Aboriginal title and
rights could be established, and what duty the federal government had to the First Nations
when trying to infringe on those rights. In 2017, the Canadian Supreme Court heard Ktunaxa
Nation v. British Columbia, which was the first case to interpret Aboriginal rights under
Section 2(a) religious freedoms claims of the Canadian Charter of Freedom and Rights. There,
the Canadian Supreme Court decided that the Ktunaxa Nation did not have religious freedom
claim under Section 2(a) over their traditional territory. The decision allowed Glacier Resorts
Ltd. and the province of British Columbia to begin building a year-long ski resort that would
destroy sacred Ktunaxa land and drive away the grizzly bear population—which played a
significant role in the Ktunaxa’s religious beliefs. Given that the Ktunaxa brought a religious
freedom claim under Section 2(a) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, their
argument was not able to withstand scrutiny in Court. This demonstrated that Aboriginal
peoples are instead more likely to succeed with claims under Section 35 of the Constitution.
As such, instead of looking at Ktunaxa Nation v. British Columbia as another precedent-setting
case, this case is arguably of little precedential value given the limited record that was available
when the Supreme Court of Canadian heard the case.
Cite as: Jennifer Mendoza, Ktunaxa Nation v. British Columbia: A Historical and Critical
Analysis of Canadian Aboriginal Law, 29 WASH. INT’L L.J. 685 (2020).

I.

INTRODUCTION

On November 2, 2017, the Supreme Court of Canada ruled in Ktunaxa
Nation v. British Columbia that the Ktunaxa Nation did not have a religious
freedom claim to protect their traditional land.1 The Ktunaxa had been fighting
the construction of a permanent ski resort on Qat’muk, their traditional land,

†

The author would like to thank Professor Eric Eberhard for his advice and support throughout the
comment-writing process.
1
Ktunaxa Nation v. British Columbia, 2017 SCC 54 (Can.).
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for over 20 years. Qat’muk is inhabited by grizzly bears,2 which are a symbol
of great importance to the Ktunaxa’s religion as they represent the Grizzly
Bear Spirit—who is a symbol of strength, guidance, and protection for their
community.3 However, the Court held that the Crown had not infringed on the
Ktunaxa’s religious belief or practice and the Crown had also met its
consultation obligation with the Ktunaxa.4
The Supreme Court of Canada’s decision is of limited precedential
value because the Ktunaxa Nation did not make a claim under Section 35 of
the Canadian Constitution. A claim under Section 35, which governs
Aboriginal law, would have been more likely to succeed and to stop the
construction of the ski resort on Qat’muk.
Section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982, provides constitutional
protection to the Aboriginal and treaty rights of Aboriginal peoples in
Canada.5 It provides indigenous peoples in Canada with rights that may
include access to ancestral lands and resources, and the right to selfgovernment.6 This section falls outside of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms (“the Charter”), which guarantees certain political rights to
Canadian citizens and civil rights to everyone in Canada. For example, in
contrast to Section 35, Section 2(a) of the Charter governs freedom of
religion.7
Section 35 of the Canadian Constitution prohibits extinguishing
existing Aboriginal land rights without the consent of those First Nations
holding interest in those lands.8 Government regulation of Aboriginal land
rights is only possible after appropriate and meaningful consultation with the
affected Aboriginal communities. This means that if the government wishes

2

Id. paras. 11–14.
Ktunaxa Nation, Qat’muk, http://www.ktunaxa.org/qatmuk/ (last visited May 3, 2020) [hereinafter
Qat’muk].
4
See
Carolyn
Harris,
Crown,
THE
CANADIAN
ENCYCLOPEDIA,
https://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/crown (last updated Apr. 1, 2016) (Canada is a
constitutional monarchy. The current sovereign of Canada is Queen Elizabeth II).
5
Constitution Act, 1982, Section 35, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c 11 (U.K.).
6
William B. Henderson & Catherine Bell, Rights of Indigenous Peoples in Canada, THE CANADIAN
ENCYCLOPEDIA, https://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/aboriginal-rights (last updated Dec. 11,
2019).
7
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, Section 2(a), being
Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c 11 (U.K.).
8
“First Nations” and “Aboriginals” will be used interchangeably throughout this case note to refer to
the Indigenous people of Canada.
3

JUNE 2020

KTUNAXA NATION V. B.C.

687

to take land from a First Nation, they must consult with said nation. If the
Indigenous peoples do not consent, the government may still be able to take
the land by showing that it made a reasonable effort to consult with them and
reach an agreement. The Canadian Supreme Court found that the Canadian
government demonstrated meaningful consultation and an effort to reach an
agreement, which allowed the ski resort on Qat’muk to be built despite
objection by the Ktunaxa Nation.
The Canadian Supreme Court has long held that the Canadian
government has a fiduciary relationship to Aboriginals under Section 35 of
the Constitution Act, 1982.9 In 1990, under R. v. Sparrow, the Supreme Court
of Canada held that any denial of Aboriginal rights under Section 35 must be
justified and that Aboriginal rights must be given priority, providing that these
rights existed at the time of the Constitution Act, 1982; thereby, creating the
“Sparrow Test.”10 In R. v. Van der Peet, the Court went beyond the Sparrow
Test and developed the “Integral to a Distinctive Culture Test,” which is used
to determine how to define an aboriginal right.11 Later, in Delgamuukw v.
British Columbia, the Court created the “Test of Justification” to determine
whether the government can infringe on Aboriginal title.12 In 2004, the Court
in Haida Nation v. British held that the Crown has a duty to consult with and
accommodate Aboriginal groups with claims to land and Aboriginal rights
prior to taking action that may adversely affect those interests.13 The scope of
this duty will vary with the strength of the claim.14 The strength of the claim
for a right or title and the seriousness of the potential effect upon the claimed
right or title, will proportionately escalate the duty involved.15 However,
regardless of what the scope of the duty is determined to be, consultation must
always be meaningful.16

9

See generally Isabelle Brideau, The Duty to Consult Indigenous People 2 (Library of Parliament,
Background
Paper
Publication
No.
2019-17-E,
2019),
https://lop.parl.ca/staticfiles/PublicWebsite/Home/ResearchPublications/BackgroundPapers/PDF/2019-17e.pdf.
10
R. v. Sparrow, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075, paras. 1076–80 (Can.); Erin Hanson & Tanisha Salomons,
Sparrow
Case,
FIRST
NATIONS
&
INDIGENOUS
STUD.:
U.
OF
B.C.,
https://indigenousfoundations.arts.ubc.ca/sparrow_case/ (last visited May 7, 2020).
11
R. v. Van der Peet, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507, para. 44–45 (Can.); Erin Hanson & Tanisha Salomons,
supra note 10.
12
Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010, para. 160–62 (Can.)
13
Haida Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of Forests), 2004 SCC 73, [2004] 3 SCR 511 (Can.)
14
Id. paras. 36–38.
15
Id. paras. 39, 68–71.
16
Id. paras. 41–42.
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II.

THE BACKDROP: AN OVERVIEW OF KTUNAXA V. BRITISH COLUMBIA AND
THE HISTORY OF CANADIAN ABORIGINAL LAW

A.

The Parties

The parties at issue were the Appellants, the Ktunaxa Nation, the
Respondents, Glacier Resort Ltd., which wanted to build the ski resort, and
the Canadian government, which controlled the land and wanted to allow
Glacier Resort to build a ski resort.
1.

The Appellants

The appellants in this case were the Ktunaxa people. The Ktunaxa’s
traditional territories are located on the international boundary between the
United States and Canada.17 It includes northeastern Washington, northern
Idaho, nonwestern Montana, southwestern Alberta and southeastern British
Columbia.18 For thousands of years, the Ktunaxa enjoyed the natural bounty
of the land they lived on, seasonally migrating all over their traditional
territory to follow the vegetation and hunting cycles.19 They obtained all of
their food, medicine, and materials needed for shelter and clothing from this
area—across the Rocky Mountains and on the Great Plains of both Canada
and the United States.20 Located at the northwestern part of their larger
territory is an area the Ktunaxa call Qat’muk—a place of spiritual significance
for the Ktunaxa “where the Grizzly Bear Spirit was born, goes to heal itself,
and returns to the spirit world.”21 As a result, the land of Qat’muk and the
Grizzly Bear Spirit are “inextricably interlinked,” with Qat’muk being the
“unique and proper place to celebrate and [honor] this spirit”—akin to a place
of worship.22
2.

The Respondents

The respondents were Glacier Resort Ltd. (“Glacier Resorts”). The
resort company wished to build a year-long ski resort on Jumbo Valley in

17

Ktunaxa Nation v. British Columbia, 2017 SCC 54, para. 1 (Can.).
Id. para. 2; Ktunaxa Nation, Who We Are, http://www.ktunaxa.org/who-we-are/ (last visited Apr. 6,
2019) [hereinafter Who We Are].
19
Id.
20
Id.
21
Ktunaxa Nation v. British Columbia, 2017 SCC 54, para. 3 (Can.); Qat’muk, supra note 3.
22
Qat’muk, supra note 3; Ktunaxa Nation, Qat’muk Declaration, http://www.ktunaxa.org/who-weare/qatmuk-declaration/ (last visited May 6, 2020).
18
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Qat’muk with lifts to glacier tuns and overnight accommodations for guests
and staff.23
B.

Timeline of the Glacier Resort Permanent Ski Resort Project

The contentious battle between the Ktunaxa people and Glacier Resorts
goes back to the 1980s when Glacier Resorts became interested in building a
permanent ski resort in the Jumbo Valley, a traditional territory of the
Ktunaxa.24 However, it was not until 1991 that Glacier Resorts filed a formal
proposal to build this resort.25 This triggered the beginning of the consultation
process with the Aboriginal peoples inhabiting the land—the Crown has a
duty to consult with Aboriginals prior to taking any action that may adversely
affect their interests.26
Early on, the Ktunaxa and the Shuswap people expressed concern over
the impact that this resort project would have on the land.27 While it is not
clear if it was a specific band or tribe involved in the initial consultation, the
Shuswap Nation is made up of nine Secwepemc communities in the Southern
Interior of British Columbia; thus, they also inhabited part of the land where
the resort would be built.28
Until 2005, the Ktunaxa and the Shuswap participated jointly in the
regulatory processes. However, that same year, the Shuswap changed their
position and indicated their support of the ski resort project; they believed that
their interests had been reasonably accommodated and that the project would
be good for their community.29 The Ktunaxa, on the other hand, still opposed
the project and consultation with them continued.30 In total, the consultation
with the Ktunaxa and the regulatory process for approval of the ski resort took
place between 1991 until 2011—over 20 years.31 In 2011, despite vehement

23

Ktunaxa Nation v. British Columbia, 2017 SCC 54, para. 4 (Can.).
Id. para. 12.
25
Id. para. 16.
26
Haida Nation v. British Columbia, 2004 SCC 73, paras. 35, 47 (Can.).
27
Id. para. 5.
28
About, SHUSWAP NATION TRIBAL COUNCIL, https://shuswapnation.org/about/bands/ (last visited
Apr. 6, 2019).
29
Ktunaxa Nation v. British Columbia, 2017 SCC 54, paras. 6, 14 (Can.).
30
Id. para. 14.
31
Id. paras. 13, 16–43. The regulatory process consist of four stages: “(1) The Commercial Alpine Ski
Policy (‘CASP’) process to determine sole proponent status; (2) The Commission on Resources and the
Environment (‘CORE’) process to determine best uses of the land; (3) An environmental assessment process
24
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opposition by the Ktunaxa Nation, the Minister approved the ski resort
project.32
The Ktunaxa sought judicial review of the Minister’s decision.33 The
Ktunaxa appealed this decision on the basis that the project would violate their
constitutional right to freedom of religion because the grizzly bears who
inhabit the area are an important part of their spiritual beliefs.34 Additionally,
they argued that the Minister’s decision breached the Crown’s duty of
consultation and accommodation.35
In the beginning of the opinion, the Supreme Court of Canada agreed
that the Ktunaxa do have a sincere spiritual connection to the area inhabited
by grizzly bears, whose spirit is an important part of their beliefs.36 However
the Supreme Court of Canada ultimately ruled against the Ktunaxa, holding
that the project did not in fact violate their freedom of religion, nor was the
consultation inadequate.37 The Court reasoned that the Ktunaxa were not
seeking protection for the freedom to believe in the Grizzly Bear Spirit or
freedom to manifest that belief, but rather sought to protect the grizzly bears’
presence in Qat’muk.38 The Court stated that this was an overreach of Section
2(a) of the Charter, which protected the religious freedom of indigenous
people in Canada.39 The crux of this decision also rested on the fact that this
religious freedom claim was contingent on the assertion that the consultation
over the project was inadequate.40 The Court relied almost exclusively on this
detail to determine whether this freedom of religion claim was valid. Upon
finding that the consultation was reasonable and adequate, though it took two
decades to eventuate an unsatisfactory proposal with the Ktunaxa, the Court
concluded that everything possible had been done to respect their religious

to resolve issues related to environmental, wildlife and cultural impact and culminating in an Environmental
Assessment Certificate (‘EAC’); and (4) submission of a Master Plan which, if approved, would lead to a
Master Development Agreement (“MDA”) between the developer and the government.” The process
included the consultation with the Ktunaxa, who participated in every stage.
32
Id.
33
Id. para. 7.
34
Id. para. 1.
35
Id. para. 7.
36
Id. para. 69.
37
Id. para. 115.
38
Id. paras. 70–71.
39
Id.
40
Id. paras. 89, 104.
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rights and concerns.41 As a result, there was no basis for the religious claim
nor was consultation inadequate.
These arguments are not persuasive. While it is true that the
consultation between the Crown—in this case the government of British
Columbia and Glacier Resorts—and the Ktunaxa Nation lasted a long time
and considered the Ktunaxa’s spiritual connection to grizzly bears and the
land, the decision ultimately infringes on the nation’s religious rights. There
is an undeniable connection between the title to the land and the religious
claim of the Ktunaxa. The reason the land is so important to the Ktunaxa is
because it plays a central role in their religious beliefs.42 Without the land, the
Ktunaxa essentially lose their place of worship and the grizzly bears will likely
be driven out of the area to keep them away from ski resort guests. However,
the majority glosses over this fact by simply saying that the Constitution does
not cover this type of religious claim, which demonstrates the limited scope
that the case was viewed in by the Court.43
C.

Brief History of Aboriginal Law in Canada

In order to understand how Aboriginal issues are treated in Canada,
specifically how Aboriginal law differs from other countries such as the
United States, it is important to look at the origins and historical development
of this area of the law. Aboriginal law in Canada is complex. A history of
colonialism and westward expansion by European powers, at the expense of
the Aboriginal people already living on the land, has shaped the relationships
between First Nations, the federal government of Canada, and their legal
relationship. Overtime, Canadian law concerning Aboriginal people has
originated in a “culturally mixed medium drawn together from diverse
jurisprudential sources.”44
First Nations historically differ from one another much the same way
as one country differs from another.45 As a result, “each group created its own
distinctive ceremonies and formalities to renew, celebrate, transfer or abandon
their legal relationships” which have evolved to become the foundation for

41
42
43
44
45

Id. para. 112.
Qat’muk, supra note 3.
JOHN BORROWS, RECOVERING CANADA: THE RESURGENCE OF INDIGENOUS LAW 4 (2002).
Id.
Id. at 3.

692

WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 29 NO. 3

many complex systems of law in North America.46 “[C]ontemporary
Canadian law concerning Aboriginal peoples partially originates in, and is
extracted from, these legal systems.”47 However, Canadian law concerning
Aboriginals also has looked to and derived from British and American
common law, and to a lesser extent, international law.48 Reasons for this
inclusion is that, like Aboriginal systems, these legal systems and sources are
“similarly grounded in the complex spiritual, political, and social customs and
conventions of particular cultures, in this case those of European nations.”49
Historically, Canadian courts have frequently refused to apply
Aboriginal law, preferring instead to recognize and apply common law as the
sole source of authority for the law in Canada.50As a result, the courts have
ruled that the Crown and its servants must conduct themselves with honor—
the honor of the crown—when dealing with First Nations and Aboriginals.51
The honor of the crown is a fundamental principle of Canadian
constitutional law.52 It is a core principle that gives rise to a variety of
substantive obligations.53 In Manitoba Metis Federation Inc. v. Canada
(Attorney General), the Supreme Court of Canada traced this principle to the
early period of European exploration and settlement when the British Crown
claimed title over the vast land in North America – land that was already
occupied and governed by Aboriginals.54 From the conflict of these claims
between European and Indigenous folk arose the special relationship between
the Crown and the Aboriginal people of Canada.55 Such relationship required

46

Id. at 3–4.
Id.
48
Id.
49
Id. See generally LAW AND THE ORDER OF CULTURE (Robert Post ed.1991) (ebook) (“cultural
creation of legal meaning”).
50
BORROWS, supra note 43, at 4.
51
KEEPING PROMISES: THE ROYAL PROCLAMATION OF 1763, ABORIGINAL RIGHTS, AND TREATIES IN
CANADA 15 (Terry Fenge & Jim Aldridge eds. 2015) [hereinafter “KEEPING PROMISES”].
52
Id.
53
Beckman v. Little Salmon/Carmacks First Nation, 2010 SCC 53, para. 42 (Can.); Haida Nation v.
British Columbia, 2004 SCC 73, paras. 16 & 18 (Can.); Manitoba Metis Federation Inc. v. Canada, 2013
SCC 14, para. 73 (Can.).
54
Manitoba Metis Federation Inc. v. Canada, 2013 SCC 14, paras. 66–67 (Can.) (first quoting Haida
Nation v. British Columbia, 2004 SCC 73, para. 32 (Can.), then quoting Taku River Tinglit First Nation v.
British Columbia 2004 SCC 74, para. 24 (Can.)).
55
KEEPING PROMISES, supra note 51, at 15.
47
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that the Crown deal honorably with the First Nation aboriginals and this
requirement was expressed in the Royal Proclamation of 1763.56
The Royal Proclamation of 1763 was the first Constitution of what is
known today as Canada.57 The Proclamation referred to “the several Nations
or Tribes of Indians, with whom [the Crown is] connected, and who live under
[the Crown’s] Protection” and laid the foundation for the constitutional
recognition and protection of Aboriginals in Canada.58 Under this document,
the British authorities in the New World agreed to protect the Aboriginal
people living in British-colonized North America against unfair treatment by
British settlers, as well as to recognize Aboriginal title.59 Thus, even today,
many indigenous leaders view the Royal Proclamation as guaranteeing their
sovereignty.60 The Courts have concluded that the ultimate purpose of the
honor of the Crown is the reconciliation with the First Nations, who lived in
Canada pre-European contact, with the assertion of Crown sovereignty.61
However, the courts have not come to the same interpretation as the
indigenous leaders so as to advance and improve Aboriginal rights. In fact,
between 1982 and 1985, out of nineteen claims Aboriginals brought to court,
none prevailed in their favor.62
Before 1982, the idea of aboriginal rights in Canada was questioned by
both the federal and provincial governments, as well as by non-Aboriginal
Canadians.63 Most of the concern centered on whether these rights even
existed. Such denial of Aboriginal rights was made possible by the “dominant
discourse” that structured Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal relations at that
time.64 According to Dale Turner, this discourse was reinforced by four

56

Id. at 15, 33.
Id.
58
Id; Royal Proclamation of 1763: Relationships, Rights and Treaties – Poster, INDIGENOUS AND
NORTHERN AFFAIRS CAN., https://www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/eng/1379594359150/1379594420080 (last
visited Dec. 15, 2019) (In Canada the Royal Proclamation of 1763 is recognized as crucially important in
establishing protocols, policies, and procedures of enduring treaty relations with Aboriginal people).
59
KEEPING PROMISES, supra note 51, at 15, 33.
60
Id.
61
Id.; Nikita Rathwell, Supreme Court of Canada Expands on the Honour of the Crown in Manitoba
Métis Federation Inc. v Canada (Attorney General), THECOURT.CA (Mar. 26, 2013),
http://www.thecourt.ca/12233/.
62
KEEPING PROMISES, supra note 51, at 15, 33.
63
DIMITRIOS PANAGOS, UNCERTAIN ACCOMMODATION: ABORIGINAL IDENTITY AND GROUP RIGHTS
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA 14 (2016).
64
Id. (citing DALE A. TURNER, THIS IS NOT A PEACE PIPE: TOWARDS A CRITICAL INDIGENOUS
PHILOSOPHY 34–35 (2006)).
57
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intertwining beliefs that were held by non-Aboriginal Canadians: 1) policies
specific to Aboriginals were discriminatory; 2) every citizen of Canada should
have the same legal and political status; 3) treaties should no longer be used;
and 4) Aboriginal people should assimilate to mainstream society
completely.65
The first Aboriginal rights case in Canada was St. Catherine’s Milling
v. The Queen.66 This case gave rise to two statements that set legal precedent
in Canada, with one concerning Aboriginal rights and the other provincial
rights.67 This is significant because at the time provincial rights were of greater
importance than Aboriginal rights.68
The issue in St. Catherine’s arose from the long-standing dispute
between the province of Ontario and the federal government over Ontario’s
northwestern boundary.69 The Aboriginals, whose traditional lands were at
stake, were neither consulted nor brought to the witness stand in the ensuing
court action.70 In 1884, the Privy Council in London held in favor of Ontario.71
However, the federal government delayed enacting the enabling legislation to
put the decision into effect.72 In response, Ontario filed suit in the High Court
of Ontario against the federally licensed St. Catherine’s Milling and Lumber
Company for illegal logging on provincial lands.73 The main argument came
down to determining who exactly had control over the Aboriginal lands in
Treaty Three.74 St. Catherine’s and Ottawa argued that before the Crown
purchased the land title, Aboriginals had been the owners of the land, but were
restricted to only sell the land to the Canadian government, which meant that
the land could not be sold to individuals or provincial governments.75
Because of the wording of the Royal Proclamation of 1763, which
referred to “lands reversed for Indians,” treaties were an essential prerequisite

65

Id.
St. Catherine’s Milling and Lumber Co. v. R., [1887] 13 S.C.R. 577 (Can.).
67
OLIVE P. DICKSON & WILLIAM NEWBIGGING, A CONCISE HISTORY OF CANADA’S FIRST NATIONS
279 (2nd ed. 2010).
68
Id.
69
Id.
70
Id.
71
Id.
72
Id.
73
Id.
74
Id.
75
Id.
66
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for the colonial expansion into British North America; most importantly, it
indicated that only the federal government could engage in that activity.76 The
decision of the Court concluded that since legal ownership of the land had
never been attributed to the Treaty Three Aboriginals, they had not conveyed
any such rights to the federal government.77 As such, the license that had been
granted to St. Catherine’s was invalid. According to the Court, Treaty Three
was legally meaningless because the Aboriginals “could treat with the Crown
for the extinction of their primitive right of occupancy.” However, if they
refused to do this, the government could continue with their settlement and
expansion efforts, outright displacing Aboriginal people from their lands.78
Adding to the notion that Aboriginal rights did not exist was the leading
legal precedent, at the time, which characterized Aboriginal rights as
“usufructs” by declaring that Aboriginal occupancy of Canadian land was a
personal and usufructuary right, dependent upon the will of the government.79
The term “usufruct” means “the right of using and taking the fruits of property
belonging to another.”80 In the context of Aboriginal rights, the usufruct
framework meant that even though First Nations and Aboriginals used and
benefitted from their traditional lands, the lands ultimately belonged to the
Crown.81
However, the view of usufruct was called into doubt in Calder et al. v.
Attorney General of British Columbia.82 This case, brought before the courts
by Nisga’a chief Frank Calder, reviewed the existence of Aboriginal title
claimed over lands historically occupied by the Nisga’a people of British
Columbia.83 In Calder, the Nisga’a Tribal Council argued that its title to the
lands in and around the Nass River Valley had “never been lawfully
extinguished.”84 While the Aboriginal plaintiffs technically lost, a majority of
justices more generally recognized the Aboriginal right to land in their

76

Id.
Id.
78
Id.
79
PANAGOS, supra note 63, at 14
80
Id. at 15.
81
Id.
82
Calder et. al v. Att’y Gen. of British Columbia, [1973] S.C.R. 313 (Can.).
83
1973 - In the Calder Case, the Supreme court held that Aboriginal rights to land did exist, citing the
1763 Royal Proclamation, DECOLONIZED, https://www.decolonize-ed.com/single-post/2017/07/07/1973--In-the-Calder-Case-the-Supreme-court-held-that-Aboriginal-rights-to-land-did-exist-citing-the-1763Royal-Proclamation (last visited Apr. 6, 2019).
84
Id.
77
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opinion’s reasoning.85 In other words, it recognized, for the first time, that
Aboriginal title has a place in Canadian law.86 An important result of the
Calder case was that it led to the establishment of the modern land claims
process, which significantly shifted the landscape for Aboriginal rights in
Canada.87
1.

Section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982

Under modern constitutional law, Aboriginal peoples enjoy the same
rights and freedoms as other Canadian citizens and are also entitled to the
same services and benefits from the government.88 However, it was not until
the 1980s that Aboriginal rights were finally recognized by the Canadian
Constitution in Section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982.89
Section 35 of the Canadian Constitution has a robust framework for the
protection of indigenous rights.90 This is one way in which Aboriginal peoples
have a variety of unique rights that pertain to them alone that are protected in
the fundamental law of the land.91 Through Section 35 of the Constitution Act
of 1982, the Canadian Government recognizes the inherent right of selfgovernment as an existing Aboriginal right.92 Recognition of this inherent
right is based on the perception that the Indigenous Peoples of Canada have
the right to govern themselves in matters that are core to their communities,
important to their unique cultures, identities, traditions, languages, and
institutions, and to their special relationship to their land and resources. 93
Section 35(1) embedded “existing Aboriginal and treaty rights” in the
Constitution—meaning that these rights could be extinguished only by
constitutional amendment rather than by a more simple act of Parliament.94

85

Id.
Id.
87
PANAGOS, supra note 63, at 15; PETER RUSSELL, CONSTITUTIONAL ODYSSEY: CAN CANADIANS
BECOME A SOVEREIGN PEOPLE? 94 (2004).
88
Minister Supply and Serv. Can., The Aboriginal Constitutional Process: An Historic Overview, in
ABORIGINAL PEOPLES, SELF-GOVERNMENT, AND CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM 13 (1991).
89
Id.; Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c 11 (U.K.).
90
The Government of Canada's Approach to Implementation of the Inherent Right and the Negotiation
of Aboriginal Self-Government, CROWN-INDIGENOUS AND N. AFF. CAN., www.aadncaandc.gc.ca/eng/1100100031843/1100100031844#inhrsg (last visited Apr. 6, 2019).
91
Minister Supply and Serv. Can., supra note 88.
92
Id.
93
Id.
94
MICHAEL ASCH, ON BEING HERE TO STAY: TREATIES AND ABORIGINAL RIGHTS 21 (2014).
86
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However, the Constitution did not address what “existing Aboriginal rights”
consisted of nor how to determine whether there was an existing right.95
In 1999, the Supreme Court of Canada issued two separate opinions on
the same case regarding a treaty right to fish.96 This case began in 1999 when
Donald Marshall Jr., son of a Mi’kmaq hereditary grand chief, was caught
fishing for eels without a license, during the off season, and with illegal nets.97
Marshall had previously been wrongfully convicted of murder and spent
eleven years in prison as a result, so he was wary of the Canadian justice
system. Instead of seeking a fishing license through the Canadian government,
Marshall asked a Mi’kmaq chief whether he could fish.98 The chief, in turn,
told him that because the Mi’kmaq had signed treaties with the British,
Marshall had the right to fish and could continue doing so.99 Marshall,
however, was later arrested and charged with violating federal fishing
regulations.100 He was eventually convicted and his conviction was affirmed
by the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal.101 The Supreme Court of Canada,
however, overturned his conviction. His acquittal was a major victory for
Aboriginal rights because the court held that under Section 35(1), Aboriginals
had the right to hunt and fish, as had been granted to them by treaties made
between the First Nations and the British in the late 1700s.102 The decision
includes the caveat that Aboriginal fishing rights protected under Section
35(1) are nonetheless subject to regulation in the best interest of the
Aboriginal people.103 Yet, the Marshall decision “emphasized the importance
of respecting treaty rights more than the government’s power to regulate treaty
rights under certain conditions.”104
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The Charter of Rights and Freedoms

The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms is a part of the Canadian
Constitution and sets out rights and freedoms Canadians believe are important
in a “free and democratic society.”105 The Charter is separated into seven
substantive provisions: 1) fundamental freedoms, 2) democratic freedoms, 3)
mobility rights, 4) legal rights, 5) equality rights, 6) language rights, and 7)
minority-language educational rights.106
The Charter protects every Canadian’s right to be treated equally under
the law, with equal application to jurisdictions and authorities governed by
Aboriginal governments.107 This equal application guarantee ensures a
balance between individual rights and freedoms and the unique values and
traditions of Aboriginal peoples in Canada.108
One important section in this charter, which had not been analyzed in
court before the Ktunaxa case, is Section 2. Section 2 governs fundamental
freedoms and subsection (a) specifically states that everyone has the freedom
of conscience and religion.109
One of the most important cases dealing with freedom of religion under
Section 2, which was addressed by the Court in Ktunaxa, is Regina v. Big M
Drug Mart Ltd.110 This landmark decision struck down the Alberta Lord’s Day
Act, which required businesses to close on Sundays, for violating Section 2(b)
of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.111 The Court used the reasoning in the
Regina case to support their decision to rule against the Ktunaxa’s religious
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freedom claim.112 Specifically, they emphasized that the court in Big M Drug
Mart Ltd. defined Section 2(a) “as protecting ‘the right to entertain such
religious beliefs as a person chooses, the right to declare religious beliefs
openly and without fear of hinderance or reprisal, and the right to manifest
religious belief by worship and practice or by teaching and dissemination.’”113
The Court concluded that Section 2 has two aspects.114 The first aspect was
that people have the freedom to hold religious beliefs.115 The second aspect
was that they also had the freedom to manifest those beliefs.116 This definition
has been adopted by other subsequent cases.117 The Court concluded that the
Ktunaxa would be free to believe in the Grizzly Bear Spirit and practice their
religion despite the construction of the ski resort, so construction of the ski
resort would not violate Section 2(a).118
If there is any threat to land title or fundamental freedoms, Aboriginal
and First Nations communities are, in theory, able to use both Section 2(a) of
the Charter and Section 35 of the Constitution to fight back in court. Section
35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 is meant to protect Aboriginal rights from
erosion by Parliament or provincial legislature. However, that does not always
mean Aboriginals are guaranteed to win or receive a favorable outcome,
especially when using a provision that has not been directly applied to
Aboriginal rights before.
Given that there is more case law dealing with Aboriginal rights under
Section 35 of the Constitution, Aboriginal rights are more likely to be upheld
directly under this provision than under the Charter of Rights and
Freedoms.119
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Aboriginal Case Law: Aboriginal Rights vs. Aboriginal Title

Based on Canadian case law, Aboriginal rights and Aboriginal title
appear to be entwined with one another.120 The Supreme Court of Canada has
concluded that Aboriginal title is just one category of Aboriginal rights.121
Certain free-standing Aboriginal rights—for example fishing or hunting–can
exist even without Aboriginal title over the land.122 Thus, the tests for
determining whether an Aboriginal right exists or whether there is Aboriginal
title are different, although they tend to connect to one another.123 While
Aboriginal title is a type of Aboriginal right recognized and affirmed by
Section 35(1), it is different from other Aboriginal rights because it “arises
where the connection of a group with a piece of land ‘was of a central
significance to their distinctive culture.’”124 Thus, the intertwinement between
Aboriginal rights and Aboriginal title is not only strong, but also to an extent,
inseparable. However, decisions from the Supreme Court of Canada have
confirmed that existing Aboriginal and treaty rights tend to be interpreted
more generously under Section 35.125 Furthermore, Section 35 affords these
rights stronger constitutional protection from erosion by governments.126
1.

Aboriginal Rights: Determining Whether an Aboriginal Right Exists
and How an Aboriginal Right Should Be Defined

a.

R. v. Sparrow

The first Canadian Supreme Court case considering Aboriginal rights
and whether they existed under Section 35 was R. v. Sparrow in 1990. In this
precedent-setting case, a member of the Musqueam Indian Band was charged
with violating the Fisheries Act.127 He alleged that the right to fish was an
immemorial right protected by treaty by virtue of Section 35.128 The Supreme
Court found that the tribal member had a protected right to fish and set out a
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criteria for interpreting rights under Section 35.129 The court held that the
government of Canada have a fiduciary relationship with Aboriginals under
Section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982; any denial of Aboriginal rights under
Section 35 must be justified and Aboriginal rights must be given priority.130 It
also did not set limits on the types of rights that can be categorized as
Indigenous rights and emphasized that the rights must be interpreted a flexible
manner “sensitive to the Aboriginal perspective.”131 The Court stated that
Section 35 only protects rights that were not extinguished (i.e., surrendered)
prior to the date the Constitution Act, 1982 came into effect.132
Under the Sparrow Test, one must first determine whether or not a right
has been infringed upon.133 Infringement is found if government activity: 1)
imposes undue hardship on the First Nation; 2) is considered by the court to
be unreasonable; and 3) prevents the right-holder from exercising that right.134
Second, the test outlines what might justify an infringement upon an
Aboriginal right.135 Infringement can be justified if: 1) it serves a valid
legislative objective—i.e., conservation of natural resources; 2) there has been
minimal infringement as possible in order to achieve the desired result; 3) fair
compensation was provided; 4) and Aboriginal groups were consulted.136
b.

R. v. Van de Peet

In R. v. Van der Peet, two Aboriginal men went fishing for sockeye
salmon.137 The men had a license that allowed them to fish legally but
prohibited them from selling the fish.138 The salmon was later sold by the
common-law wife of one of the men, Dorothy Van der Peet, who was a
member of the Sto:lo Nation.139 Van der Peet was later charged, under British
Columbia Fishery Regulations, with having unlawfully sold fish that was
caught under a food-only fish license.140 The issue before the court was
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whether the law preventing the sale of the fish infringed the Aboriginal right
of fishing under Section 35.141 Ultimately, the court ruled that Aboriginal
fishing rights did not extend to commercial selling of fish.142
The Court developed an “Integral to a Distinctive Culture Test,” which
modified the Sparrow Test, to determine how to define an Aboriginal right as
protected by Section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982.143 The Test has ten
main parts:

141
142
143

(1)

Courts must take into account the perspective of Aboriginal
peoples themselves

(2)

Courts must identify precisely the nature of the claim being made
in determining whether an Aboriginal claimant has demonstrated
the existence of an Aboriginal right

(3)

In order to be integral a practice, custom or tradition must be of
central significance to the Aboriginal society in question

(4)

The practices, customs and traditions which constitute
Aboriginal rights are those which have continuity with the
practices, customs and traditions that existed prior to contact

(5)

Courts must approach the rules of evidence in light of the
evidentiary difficulties inherent in adjudicating Aboriginal
claims

(6)

Claims to Aboriginal rights must be adjudicated on a specific
rather than general basis

(7)

For a practice, custom or tradition to constitute an Aboriginal
right it must be of independent significance to the Aboriginal
culture in which it exists
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(8)

The integral to a distinctive culture test requires that a practice,
custom or tradition be distinctive; it does not require that that
practice, custom or tradition be distinct

(9)

The influence of European culture will only be relevant to the
inquiry if it is demonstrated that the practice, custom or tradition
is only integral because of that influence.

(10) Courts must take into account both the relationship of Aboriginal
peoples to the land and the distinctive societies and cultures of
Aboriginal peoples.144
Here, the Court found that the specific right claimed was the right to
exchange fish for money.145 As such, this is the right that must be considered
an integral part of the distinctive culture of the Sto:lo community. However,
the Court concluded that while the Sto:lo did exchange fish for money preEuropeans contact, it was not a significant, integral or defining feature of their
society.146 The reasoning for this conclusion was that: 1) pre-contact fish
exchanges were done primarily for food purposes, 2) there was no indication
that the exchanges were widespread enough to suggest that they were a
defining feature of the society, 3) the exchange between the Sto:lo and the
Hudson Bay Company occurred due to European influence, and 4) there was
an absence of specialization of the exploitation of fishery within the society.147
Therefore, there was no aboriginal right found to sell the fish and the Court
did not proceed to the rest of the test.148
2.

Aboriginal Title: Its Scope, the Importance of the Duty to consult, and
Meaningful Consultation

a.

Delgamuukw v. British Columbia

Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, a Canadian Supreme Court case
decided in 1997, became a landmark decision on Aboriginal title.149 While the
newly adopted 1982 Constitution enacted Section 35 and added protection for
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existing Aboriginal rights, it did not specify what those rights were, which
Delgamuukw helped clarify.150 The decision described the scope and type of
the protection given to Aboriginal title under Section 35 of the Constitution
Act, 1982, defined how a claimant can prove Aboriginal title, and clarified
how the justification test from R. v. Sparrow applies when Aboriginal title is
infringed.151
In Delgamuukw, hereditary chiefs from the Gitxsan and the
Wet'suwet'en attempted to negotiate jurisdiction, recognition of ownership,
and self-government since Europeans first began settling on their traditional
lands in the 1800s.152 The Canadian federal government and the British
Columbia provincial government “rebuked all efforts by the Gitxsan and
Wet'suwet'en Chiefs to negotiate on ownership.”153 The Chiefs then filed suit
claiming unextinguished Aboriginal title over the land in question.154
This groundbreaking ruling by the Supreme Court contained the first
clear and definitive statement on Aboriginal title in Canada and the scope of
protection that the title is afforded under the Constitution Act of 1982.155 It
held that Aboriginal title included the right to exclusive use and occupation of
land for purposes that are not necessarily aspects of the Aboriginal
community’s essential practices, customs, and traditions, as long as they are
not irreconcilable with the Aboriginal community’s attachment.156 It included
language from Sparrow which said Section 35(1) “provides a solid
constitutional base upon which subsequent negotiations can take place” to
outline the justification test for infringements of Aboriginal title.157 The
justification test included: 1) the infringement of the Aboriginal or First
Nation must be in furtherance of a legislative objective that is compelling and
substantial; and 2) there must be an assessment of whether the infringement

150

PERSKY, supra note 149, at 6.
Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010, 1014–1020 (Can.)
152
Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010, para. 7 (Can.).
153
Id.
154
Id.
155
Andrew Kurjata, 20 Years Ago, This Court Case Changed the Way Canadians Understood
Indigenous Rights, CBS NEWS, (Dec. 11, 2017, 7:22 AM), https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/britishcolumbia/delgamuukw-vs-british-columbia-20-years-rights-titles-1.4440703.
156
Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010, para. 111.
157
Id. para. 186.
151

JUNE 2020

KTUNAXA NATION V. B.C.

705

is consistence with the special fiduciary duty relationship between the Crown
and the Aboriginal people.158
Three aspects of Aboriginal title are relevant here.159 First, Aboriginal
title includes the right to exclusive use and occupation of the land.160 Second,
it also encompasses the right to choose what uses land can be put to, subject
to the ultimate limit that those uses cannot destroy the ability of the land to
sustain future generations of Aboriginals.161 Finally, the lands held pursuant
to Aboriginal title have an inescapable and inevitable economic component.162
Therefore, negotiations should include all Aboriginal nations which have a
stake in the territory claimed and should be entered into in good faith by the
Crown.163 It also set a precedent for Indigenous rights and the use of oral
testimony in Canadian courts.164 The Court acknowledged that oral history is
typically the only record that Aboriginals have of their past.165 While oral
testimony evidence does present some challenges as “out-of-court statements,
passed on through an unbroken chain across the generations of a particular
aboriginal nation to the present-day,” the Court ruled that the law of evidence
must be adapted so as to accommodate and place oral testimony and an equal
footing with other types of historical evidence (e.g. historical documents)
which the courts are familiar with.166 Failure to do this would create and
impose a difficult burden of proof on Aboriginals.167
b.

Haida Nation v. British Columbia

Haida Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of Forests) is the leading
Supreme Court decision on the Crown’s duty to consult Aboriginal groups
prior to exploiting lands to which they may have claims.168 The case’s history
traces to more than forty years before it was decided. In 1961, the provincial
government of British Columbia issued a “Tree Farm License” on the Queen
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Charlotte Islands, located off its coast.169 At the time, the Haida Nation had a
pending claim to the island land, which had not yet been recognized at law.170
The Haida Nation also claimed an Aboriginal right to harvest red cedar in that
area. In 1999, the Minister of Forests authorized a transfer of the license to
the Weyerhauser Company without consent from or consultation with the
Haida Nation.171 In 2000, the Haida Nation brought suit, requesting that the
replacement and transfer be set aside.172 The issue before the Court was
whether there was a duty to consult with the Aboriginal nation and if so, what
that duty entailed.173 The Court held that the Crown had a duty to consult with
and accommodate Aboriginal groups with claims to land and Aboriginal rights
prior to taking action that may adversely affect those interests.174 The specific
duty varies depending on the strength of the claim and degree of the harm and
cannot be delegated to third parties.175
c.

Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British Columbia

In 2014, forty-one years after the Supreme Court held in Calder that the
concept of Aboriginal title exists under Canadian law, the Court formally
declared that the Tsilhqot’in people have Aboriginal title in a specific area of
British Columbia historically occupied by them.176 Tsilhqot’in Nation v.
British Columbia is an important Canadian Supreme Court decision that “had
an immediate impact on First Nations communities that held Aboriginal title
or were claiming Aboriginal title, but which had not been consulted—or felt
they had not been consulted in good faith—about commercial developments
on their traditional lands.”177 The Nation consisted of six bands of several
thousand Aboriginals who had lived in land they considered rightfully theirs
in central British Columbia for centuries.178 However, there were no treaties
or land claims agreement that applied to their traditional land base.179
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By 1983, the British Columbia provincial government granted a permit
to a logging company to cut trees in the area claimed by the Tsilhqot’in.180
Reasonably, the Nation objected and began land claims litigation for part of
their territory where several thousand of them resided.181 Negotiations
continued until 2012, when the British Columbia Court of Appeal decided that
the Tsilhqot’in had not established their land claim, although it could
potentially be established in the future.182 The decision was appealed to the
Supreme Court, which recognized the Tsilhqot’in’s Aboriginal title over the
land.183
The Court relied heavily on the Haida Nation decision. The Justices
pointed out that the government of British Columbia did not make any attempt
to consult with the Tsilhqot’in or to accommodate the concerns the Tsilhqot’in
had about logging in their territory.184 British Columbia asserted two reasons
for their support of the logging. First was that the logging was necessary to
battle pine-battle infestation.185 Second, that there would be economic benefits
to the people of British Columbia from the logging, which constituted a
legislative objective substantial and compelling enough to infringe Aboriginal
interests without consultation.186 The Court found that government failed to
provide compelling evidence for these claims and even with compelling
evidence, consultation have been required because there was substantial
evidence supporting a valid land claim by the Tsilhqot’in.187
To prove a valid land claim, occupation must be 1) sufficient, 2)
continuous, and 3) exclusive.188 The Court concluded that the evidence
indicated that the Tsilhqot’in had continuously occupied the land for centuries
and that their occupation was “exclusive” because other Aboriginal groups
would need permission to pass through Tsilhqot’in territory.189 As to the duty
to consult, the Court concluded that the degree of consultation and
accommodation required is “proportionate to the strength of the claim and to
the seriousness of the adverse impact the contemplated governmental action

180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189

Id. paras. 5–6.
Id.
Id. para. 8.
Id. para.153.
Id. para. 96.
Id. paras. 126–127.
Id.
Id. paras. 93–94.
Id. para. 25.
Id. para. 63.

708

WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 29 NO. 3

would have on the claimed right.” Greater requirement of consultation and
accommodation is needed where title has been established.190 If consultation
is found to be inadequate, the decision of the government can be suspended
or quashed by the courts.191 Furthermore, the Crown must also “ensure that
the proposed government action is substantively consistent with the
requirements of” Section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982—requiring both a
compelling and substantial government objective and that the proposed action
is consistent with the fiduciary duty of the Crown to the Aboriginal people.192
Where Aboriginal title is unproven, the Crown still owes a procedural duty
imposed by the honor of the Crown to consult with the First Nation and, if and
when appropriate, accommodate the unproven Aboriginal interest.193
3.

Application of Case Law in Ktunaxa Case

a.

Aboriginal Rights Tests

In Ktunaxa, the Court made no direct findings as to the existence of the
Ktunaxa’s religious right. Had the Ktunaxa brought their claim under Section
35, the Court would have been required to consider whether or not the claimed
religious right existed prior to enactment of the Constitution Act, 1982. The
religious claim could have been proven using oral history as evidence of the
Ktunaxa’s deeply held spiritual, and religious belief in the grizzly bear and its
connection to Qat’muk since time immemorial, at the trial stage.194 If such
evidence would have been introduced and deemed valid, the Court would
have likely found that the Ktunaxa’s religious right did in fact exist prior to
1982, and therefore should have been afforded protection.
Had the Canadian Supreme Court used the Sparrow Test, they would
have likely concluded that there was a definite infringement on the religious
freedom right of the Ktunaxa in connection to their land. First, the
construction of the ski resort would not only drive away an essential part of
the Ktunaxa’s religion, the grizzly bears, but also completely obliterate their
traditional land. The important relationship between Qat’muk’s and the
Grizzly Bear Spirit is also inseparably intertwined with its importance for
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living grizzly bears now and in the future.195 Destroying this traditionally
sacred land would create a domino effect which would drive away the
important physical connection the Ktunaxa have to the Grizzly Bear Spirit and
would simultaneously forever do away with their place of worship of
thousands of years. For the Crown and Court to argue that the Ktunaxa can
easily find another place to worship would gravely undermine the serious
impact that the government action is creating. Because destruction of the land
and removal of the grizzly bears harms the Ktunaxa’s spiritual connection at
Qat’muk, there would be a challenge to determine whether the Ktunaxa would
be able to practice their religious beliefs at all. Second, this hardship would
likely be viewed as unreasonable because this land and spiritual connection
are not tangibly replaceable. The Ktunaxa cannot simply find another sacred
site with the same spiritual and religious significance. This land is
irreplaceable and as such not likely to be given an appropriate monetary value
in the eyes of the Ktunaxa Nation. Third, as mentioned before, with the land
and the grizzly bears gone, the Ktunaxa would likely no longer have their
spiritual connection to the Grizzly Bear Spirit, or at least the connection would
likely not be as strong. Thus, under Sparrow, there would exist a clear
infringement on the Ktunaxa’s religious freedom.
Moving to the second part of the test, whether infringement is justified,
this infringement is not justifiable because while the Ktunaxa Nation was
consulted and may possibly have been offered compensation, the first two
factors are not met. In this case, there is no valid legislative objective since
the primary reason that the Ktunaxa land is in dispute is that the government
intended to build a permanent ski resort. This would destroy land and force
wildlife, such as the grizzly bears, from their homes, contrary to what the
Court deemed as a valid legislative objective, e.g. conservation. Additionally,
this would mean excessive infringement because 1) a significant portion of
Ktunaxa land would be taken away, along with their sacred land, and 2) the
grizzly bear population would be driven away, thereby destroying the
foundation of the spiritual connection the Ktunaxa have to the land. This is a
clear infringement on the Ktunaxa’s right to their land and their religious
freedom.
Modern Courts use the ten-part “Integral to a Distinctive Culture Test”
from Van der Peet, to identify an Aboriginal right in Section 35(1) of the
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Constitution Act, 1982, specifically, practices, traditions and customs central
to the Aboriginal societies that existed prior to contact with the Europeans.196
First, considering the perspective of the Ktunaxa, it is evident that they
feel their religious freedom is an integral part of their society as the “Grizzly
Bear Spirit” is an important source of guidance, strength, protection and
spirituality.”197 Second, the precise nature of the claim brought by the Ktunaxa
is that the creation of a permanent ski resort on their land would drive away
the grizzly bear population, which in turn would impact their fundamental
worshipping practices. The grizzly bear is an important aspect of their religion
and connection to the land, the ski resort would completely change and more
than likely destroy that connection. Third, the Ktunaxa’s belief is distinct from
other Aboriginal societies because they are the only ones that have been
identified as to both have a stake in Qat’muk and a religious connection to the
land in question.198 Fourth, the Ktunaxa likely can prove continuous control
of the land prior to contact with the use of oral, as mentioned before, or
anthropological evidence. The fifth factor is related to factor four in that it
requires courts to consider the difficulties that First Nations may experience
in providing evidence given that their practices, customs, and traditions did
not include written records.199 Sixth, the claim is adjudicated on a specific
basis since it is specifically asserting a religious right tied to the Ktunaxa’s
ancestral land and the impact they would suffer as a result of destruction of
the site. Seventh, the religious claim is likely of independent significance to
the Ktunaxa. There is no mention of it arising from another practice or custom.
Eighth, the religious claim would make the Ktunaxa a distinctive culture,
under Van der Peet, in that it is an important and fundamental part of their
society as whole which is interconnected to their land. Ninth, there is no
evidence presented that this religious practice was affected by European
culture, and even if it was “European arrival and influence cannot be used to
deprive an Aboriginal group of an otherwise valid claim to an Aboriginal
right.”200 Finally, as mentioned before, the religious freedom claim is
inevitably tied to the Ktunaxa’s land since the grizzly bears, who plays an
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important role in their religion as symbols of the Grizzly Bear Spirit, inhabit
it.
b.

Aboriginal Title Tests

Had the Ktunaxa brought a claim for land title instead of a religious
freedom claim, they would have likely been more successful and had an easier
time meeting the requirements outlined in Delgamuukw, Haida Nation, and
Tsilhqot’in.
Using Delgamuukw’s justification for infringement test, the first part of
the test is not met. Construction of a permanent ski resort is not in furtherance
of a legislative objective that is compelling and substantial.
Not only does building a ski resort disregard the Ktunaxa’s interest, but
it also damages the reconciliation of the Ktunaxa with the broader community.
This differs from Delgamuukw in which the Court found that the Aboriginal
and the broader community had a shared interest in the conservation of
fisheries and that that interest was a compelling and substantial objective.201
The conservation recognized fishing as an integral part to many Aboriginal
cultures and sought to reconcile Aboriginal societies and the broader
communities by ensuring that there are fish enough for everyone.202 No such
argument can be made here for building a ski resort. Given that the first
requirement would not be met, it is inevitable the second requirement would
not be met either.
Applying Tsilhqot’in to Ktunaxa further supports that the Ktunaxa
might have had a more favorable outcome had the Ktunaxa gone through the
provincial government tribunals instead of the federal administrative court
system. First, the Ktunaxa would likely be able to establish title with oral
history as was done in both the Delgamuukw and Tsilhqot’in cases. There is
some indication that the evidence could have been compelling, given that even
the Supreme Court Justices noted that the Ktunaxa had been living on Qa’muk
for thousands of years. Second, even though the Court found consultation to
be sufficient, building a year-long ski resort would not constitute a legislative
objective substantial and compelling enough to infringe Aboriginal interests.
While the British Columbia government can argue that the ski resort would
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benefit the Ktunaxa people by, perhaps, creating jobs for them, it is clear that
based on the sentiments of the Ktunaxa people over the construction of this
project, they are unlikely to seek out jobs from it. As such, the government of
British Columbia would need to accommodate the Ktunaxa’s concerns. If this
cannot be done, the government action cannot proceed because it has not
justified infringing on the Aboriginal group’s right.
4.

Implications for Future Aboriginal Cases

While the Ktunaxa decision should not be looked at for precedential
value, there are major implications that arise from it, specifically regarding
the duty to consult, religious freedom claims, and judicial review. The case
may push other First Nations to look at the possible connection between a
religious claim and their lands—thereby bringing future religious claims
under Section 35 of the Constitution Act, rather than Section 2 of the Charter
of Freedoms and Rights. Moreover, these claims will likely be brought in a
trial setting vs. administrative tribunal setting so that a trial court can make
adequate conclusions as to the validity of the claims presented.
a.

Duty to Consult

Early on in Ktunaxa, the Court critically analyzed two issues: 1) the
issue of the sacred site being raised “late” in the consultation process and 2)
the issue of whether Ktunaxa were not willing to accept any of the
accommodation offered, or willing to compromise on the matter of the
destruction of the sacred site through the construction of the permanent ski
resort.203 The first issue was viewed by the Court as the Ktunaxa not asserting
their rights in a timely manner.204 Given how late in the process these concerns
were raised, the Court did not weigh or find them persuasive in the outcome
of consultation. 205
However, it is worth recognizing that the consultation in this case began
well before any of Aboriginal law precedent-setting cases were decided. This
was not mentioned by the Court or was it acknowledged in any way.
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Furthermore, no other case before or after Ktunaxa has determined what an
appropriate amount of time to bring a claim would be or whether a claim
should be brought by a certain time. Thus, without further guidance,
Aboriginal nations are left to wonder whether there is a time limit to bringing
claims and whether their claims will be taken less seriously if not brought
immediately in the during consultation process.
If the Ktunaxa could prove that their connection to the land—for
religious worship and practices—has continued over many generations and is
directly connected to how and whether future generations will continue
religious practices, the Ktunaxa’s claim for title under Section 35 would be
very strong. That showing would likely require the government to halt any
construction efforts that would adversely affect the Ktunaxa’s interests in the
land.
b.

Religious Freedom

The Court also implicitly reasons that Section 2(a) of the Charter does
not recognize that spiritual beliefs and practices can be fundamentally
connected to specific locations. Therefore, Section 2(a) does not extend to the
“object of beliefs” or the “spiritual focal point of worship.”206
This conclusion is not persuasive. If one was to compare religious belief
and its connection to a certain location in the context of a church, mosque, or
synagogue, the courts would likely find that destruction of these sites would
fundamentally interfere with the ability to worship.207 However, the Court did
not recognize these parallels and instead seemed to have downplayed the
importance of the Ktunaxa’s religious belief in the grizzly bear.
As of now, there is no other case that has been brought before the
Canadian courts by a First Nation that asserts a religious freedom claim
connected to their ancestral land. Given the disappointing outcome of the
Ktunaxa case, Aboriginals will likely not use Section 2(a) as a tool to protect
the spiritual importance of a specific sacred site. Thus, best chance of success
will be to bring a land claim under Section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982.
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Judicial Review

On judicial review, the Ktunaxa sought to have the Court declare
Qat’muk a sacred site to the nation in order to prevent permanent construction
on that site.208 However, the Court concluded that an administrative decision
maker, and subsequently a judge on judicial review, is not able to rule on the
existence of a claim to a Section 2(a) Charter right.209 Specifically, the Court
stated that “the solution is not for courts to make far-reaching constitutional
declarations in the course of judicial review proceedings incidental to, and illequipped to determine, Aboriginal rights and title claims.”210
The decision of the Court infers that there is a limit as to what can be
determined on judicial review in the context of the duty to consult and
accommodate, indicating that judicial review does not function as a forum for
the adjudication of the existence of rights.211 Instead, this determination must
take place in a trial setting, where the Ktunaxa’s claims could have been heard
through evidence presented to the trial court.212
III.

CONCLUSION

The Ktunaxa’s claim of religious infringement by the construction of a
permanent ski resort on their ancestral land was amply supported by their oral
history and religious practices. Construction of the permanent ski resort will
have an irreparable impact on their land. However, the record did not
adequately explore the religious significance of this land and the Supreme
Court ultimately ruled for the government. While this is not the right outcome,
it is what the Aboriginal people and the courts are left with. Had the Ktunaxa
instead brought an Aboriginal land claim instead of a religious freedom claim,
they would have had a better chance of preventing the construction of a ski
resort on their land. While no precedential value should be given to this case
due to the undeveloped record, the implications of this decision are clear:
Aboriginal nations must rely on Section 35 claims of the Constitution Act,
1982 to stop the government from infringing on their rights. A further
consideration is that as time goes on, less evidence of First Nations
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occupation, practices, and customs will be available as traditional use of oral
history is dying out. This negatively impacts future generations of Aboriginals
who will be left with be little use to support claims to their rights and land
titles. History and the present ongoing issues in Aboriginal law indicate that
this, unfortunately, is very likely to happen.
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